WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY    AND POLICY ANALYSIS   1994-1995 Workshop Colloquia Presentations     http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/colloquia/materials/1994-95_colloquia.html

September 12, 1994

Professor Vincent Ostrom, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Comparing African and European Experiences: The Place of Literate Vernacular Languages in Cultural Development."

September 19, 1994

Professor Niklas Luhmann, Department of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, and Visiting Scholar at the Department of Germanic Studies, Indiana University. "Theory of the Welfare State."

September 26, 1994

Professor Thrainn Eggertsson, Department of Economics and Business Administration, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, and Visiting Research Associate at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Property Rights, Economic Analysis and the Information Problem."

October 3, 1994

Professor Roy Gardner, Department of Economics, Indiana University, and Professor Juergen Von Hagen, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University, and Center for Economic Policy Research, UK, and Department of Economics, University of Mannheim. "Voting over Budgets: Preliminary Experimental Results."

October 10, 1994

Professor George J. Stolnitz, Population Institute, Indiana University. "A Generalized Cause-Effect Model for Linking Mortality Changes to Age Composition."

October 17, 1994

Susan K. Laury, Doctoral Student, Department of Economics, Indiana University. "The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: Provision of a Pure Public Good with Diminishing Marginal Returns." [co-authors James M. Walker and Arlington W. Williams, Department of Economics, Indiana University]

October 24, 1994

Clark Gibson, Department of Political Science, Duke University, and Visiting Scientist at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "The Politics of Structural Choice in a One-party State: The Case of Wildlife Policy in Zambia."

October 31, 1994

Andrew Herr, Doctoral Student, Department of Economics, Indiana University. "Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Repetition, Time Dependence, and Group Size."[co-authors Roy Gardner and James M. Walker, Department of Economics, Indiana University]

November 7, 1994

Professor Norbert L. Kerr, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University. "Does My Contribution Matter?: Efficacy and Providing Public Goods."

November 14, 1994

Professor James M. Ferris, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, and Visiting Research Associate at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, and the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy."Organizing the Production of Public Services: Analyses of Local Government Contracting Decisions."

November 28, 1994

Professor Hans Petter Saxi, Department of Public Policy and Administration, Bodþ College, and Visiting Research Associate at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Reform and Organizational Development in Municipalities as Fashion?"

December 5, 1994

Professor Alexander V. Obolonsky, Doctor of Law and Political Science, Head Research Fellow at the Institute of State and Law Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and Visiting Research Associate at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Reflections on the Meaning of Russian Experience."

January 16, 1995

Professor John T. Williams, Department of Political Science and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, and Brian K. Collins , Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, Indiana University. "Credible Commitment to Democratic Development." [co-author Mark G. Lichbach, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado]

January 23, 1995

Professors Roy Gardner, Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Elinor Ostrom, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and James Walker, Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Majority Rule Voting as a Coordinating Mechanism: Behavior in a Common Pool Resource Setting Theoretical Issues and an Experimental Protocol."

January 30, 1995

Dr. Charles J. Myers, School of Economics and Finance, Golden Gate University, and Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Toward Understanding Early U.S. National Debt Retirement: The Fiscal Sociology Approach."

February 6, 1995

Dr. Wai Fung (Danny) Lam, Research Associate, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Technological Investments and Infrastructure Performance: Governing and Managing Irrigation Systems in Nepal."

February 13, 1995

Andrew Herr, Doctoral Student, Department of Economics, Indiana University. "Water Markets: An Economical Approach to Snake River Salmon Recovery."

February 20, 1995

Professor Leslie A. Real, Department of Biology, Indiana University. "The Evolution and the Ecology of Decision Making Under Uncertainty."

February 27, 1995

Colloquium Presentation on TRUST

Valerie Braithwaite, Research Fellow, Administration, Compliance, and Governability Program, Australian National University.
Professor Karen Cook, Chairperson, Department of Sociology, University of Washington.
Professor Robert Frank, Department of Economics and Business, Cornell University.
Professor Margaret Levi, Department of Political Science, University of Washington.
Professor Toshio Yamagishi, Department of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University, Japan.

March 6, 1995

Sue Crawford, Graduate Student, Department of Political Science and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. "Clergy as Local Policy Actors."

March 13, 1995

Professor Barbara Allen, Department of Political Science, Carleton College. "The Puzzle of Gender in Liberal Theory."

March 20, 1995

Professor David Guillet, Department of Anthropology, Catholic University of America. "Rethinking Legal Pluralism: Local Law and State Law in the Evolution of Water Property Rights in Northwestern Spain." [This session co-sponsored with the Anthropological Center for Training and Research on Global Environmental Change (ACT).]

March 27, 1995

Professor Scott Atran, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and Department of Anthropology, the University of Michigan. "The Commons Breakdown in Mayaland: Causes, Consequences and Critical Responses."

April 3, 1995

Tjip Walker, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University. "The Democratic Disciplines: Applying Institutional Analysis at the Macro-Level in Africa."

April 7, 1995

Professor Rita Mae Kelly, School of Justice Studies, Arizona State University. "Gender, Institutions, and Affirmative Action: From Sex Differences to Gendered Organizational Analysis."

April 10, 1995

Professor Zainal A. Mohamed, on sabbatical at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. "Some Facets of Organizational Restructuring in Government-Owned Enterprises in Malaysia: A Look at Eleven Diverse Enterprises."

April 17, 1995

Professor Timothy N. Cason, Department of Economics, University of Southern California. "Laboratory Evaluations of EPA's Emission Trading Auction." [This session co-sponsored with the Department of Economics.]

April 24, 1995

Professor Aleksandras Shtromas, Department of History and Political Science, Hillsdale College. "Unity in Diversity: How to Accommodate Various Ethnic and Religious Identities in a Universal World Order."

The focus of my inquiry in "Comparing African and European Experiences" is on language with special attention to the development of literate vernacular languages to account for the contrast between European and African civilizations. In recent correspondence, Amos Sawyer has written:

        The tragedy of Liberia is, unfortunately, not the

        exception, but a reflection of the general state of

        affairs emerging in Africa today. In many cases, the

        collapse of the state has been accompanied by the most

        gruesome forms of human suffering. . . . The alienation

        of the state from society is the order of the day. We

        are now seeing what an artificial contrivance the state

        in Africa is.

I shall attempt to show how the failure to give attention to the development of literate vernacular languages is associated with the failure of the African state, and how literate vernacular languages play an essential role in the development of common knowledge, shared communities of understanding, patterns of social accountability, and mutual trust as necessary requisites for advances in human civilizations. This paper will serve as a background for an oral presentation and discussion.

Since about 500 years the formula "state" serves as a simplifying self-description of the political system. "Constitutional state" served as specifying formula during the nineteenth century, and "welfare state" was an addition, a supplement to this formula, suggested by the increasing democratization of the political system, by the split between state organization and party organizations and by electoral campaigning. At the end of our century the prominence of this formula seems to lose its appeal. There are several reasons for this. The increasing centrality of the financial system of the economic system and its new financial instruments makes socialist policies difficult, if not impossible. Risk awareness emerges as a new political problem. In retrospective, conflicts of interest that could be solved or attenuated by legal and financial means appear as trivial conflicts, compared to what we have to expect from different kinds of "fundamentalistic" concerns organized by a new combination of "new social movements" and mass media reports. And last but not least, the world society and its political subsystem changes the concept of "sovereignty" from a right to arbitrary (democratic or undemocratic) decisions to regional responsibility for maintaining a minimum of social order--not so much in terms of increasing welfare but in terms of human rights and environmental care, concerning ecological questions, risks of modern technologies, demographic problems, migrations, criminal organizations, etc.

This paper is being prepared for a conference at the University of Maryland, College Park, on October 14-15. The theme of the conference is: What is institutionalism now? My task is to account for the evolution and the current state of property rights analysis. The paper seeks to accomplish the following:

1. Introduce the information problem and place it at the center of theories of social systems.
2. Make the case that the area of competence for a theory of social systems is defined (partly) by its approach to the information problem, and that frequent applications of social theories outside their areas of competence have produced misleading results.
3. Trace the development of the property rights approach away from the traditional neoclassical theory of production and exchange in terms of (a) the incorporation of new elements of the information problem, and (b) the extension of the analysis to political and social issues.
4. Discuss the limits of the property rights approach and also respond to misguided criticism.

Suppose that a deliberative body, like a committee or a cabinet, must decide its budget. It is the conventional wisdom that the most economical type of budgeting in this case is top down: first the total budget is chosen, and then that budget is allocated among functional areas. An alternate type of budgeting is bottom up: the budget for each functional area is decided in sequence, and the total budget emerges as the sum total of functional areas. When voters vote strategically, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) show that whether top-down or bottom-up budgeting leads to a smaller overall budget depends on the distribution of voters' ideal points. We conduct experiments to see to what extent voters vote strategically. Our major finding is that subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well, and in particular correctly predicts which voting mechanism will lead to the smaller overall budget. These results can be applied to the ongoing of budget reforms taking place or being contemplated by the members of the European Union.

A transition of sea change proportions is transforming the ways in which mortality movements are affecting age composition throughout the world's industrialized regions and among increasing numbers of developing-area populations. Assuming only that the global long-run downtrending mortality transitions observed in much of this century will not be radically reversed, the cause-effect linkage patterns which have become commonplace in recent decades in all of these areas, often as recently as the 1970s, will have momentous socio-cultural, economic and political impacts for as far ahead as can be usefully foreseen.
The linkage-analytic approach described in this paper demonstrates, apparently for the first time, that the demographic causal processes which underlie this prospect can and need to be considered in survival- rate terms exclusively. Death-rate measures, though effectively the universal focus of attention by demographers and other analysts of mortality-age linkage patterns, are either unusable or simply not needed for identifying the survivor-related magnitudes invariably involved when seeking to measure, interpret or project how population sizes or proportions respond to altered mortality risks.
The comprehensive generality of the approach described in the paper to mortality-age linkage determinations merits special emphasis. To begin with, such determinations can be consistently obtained for any pattern of mortality-change movements: large or small in magnitude; upward or downward trending, plateau-like or fluctuating in directions; involving the relatively low mortality levels characteristic of all developed nations or the full gamut of much higher mortality variations encountered in the developing areas (though the illustrative focus here will be on the U.S. post-World War II experience, a high longevity situation). Further, the causal mortality movements and age- compositional effects being considered can encompass unrestricted numbers of calendar periods, ranging from a single inter-quinquennial change of gender-age-specific survival regimes to entire historical or projected time series of such regime shifts. Cause-effect linkage relations can be established separately by gender, hence can avoid the need to assume, regardless of the facts (as in the use of stable-age linkage models), that male and female mortality-movement patterns necessarily track each other closely. The effects measures provided by the approach can be in terms of comparative size indicators, absolute size magnitudes or age-proportion measures. Both comparative and absolute size effect outcomes and their traced causal mortality-change origins will be seen to have distinctive major uses for interpreting or anticipating the demographic causal linkages involved and their expected socio-economic (e.g., social security, health-care, dependency ratio and labor market adjustment) consequences.
A by-product aspect of special interest on broad methodological grounds is that the linkages approach to be described provides a concrete thought model for illustrating how extensive cause and effect complexes can nevertheless permit establishing unique interconnections between individually identified causes and their separably identified effects during as many subsequent individual periods as are deemed relevant for analysis. And for illustrating that each of the effects impacting on any given period of interest can, conversely, be linked separably to its individual or multiple period-specific mortality-change causes.

Experimental research investigating the voluntary provision of a pure public good has shown that participants consistently allocate a portion of their resources to this good when the full-information noncooperative game theoretic (Nash) prediction is to allocate zero resources to this good. This paper explores the robustness of this result in an environment where both the Nash and group optimum outcomes call for a division of group resources between the private and public goods. It further considers how changes in individual resource endowment, group size, and supplemental earnings information affect allocations to the public good.
Preliminary results indicate that groups allocate a greater portion of their resources than the Nash prediction, but like the boundary case described above, allocations fall short of the group optimum. An increase in the individual resource endowment leads to increased allocations to the public good. However, this difference is not significant when participants are given detailed instructions that describe the declining marginal benefit to the public good, compared to the constant marginal cost of allocating a token to the public good. Increases in group size, from N=5 to N=10, also lead to a significant increase in allocations to the public good. Providing detailed earnings instructions to participants leads to a significant decrease in allocations to the public good.

Many scholars and practitioners see the activities of public agencies as remedies to society's collective dilemmas. Work in the new institutional economics, however, has challenged this conceptualization. Rather than view bureaucracies as solutions to collective action problems, some new institutionalists conceptualize public agencies as a means by which political winners can impose their favored distributive outcomes on the rest of society. Further, some scholars assert the structural design of public agencies can be explained by reference to their political and distributive features.
This paper employs and extends this approach. I argue that the design of public agencies can be explained by examining their designers' strategic choices under two important constraints: the designers' original share of public authority, and the pattern of political uncertainty generated by a particular system of government.
I apply this theory to the case of Zambian wildlife policy in the 1980s. Following the dramatic increase in poaching rates in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s, individuals and interest groups attempted to create new wildlife programs that could circumvent the influence of party and government officials who, using wildlife as a resource for patronage politics, routinely thwarted attempts to strengthen conservation laws. The designers of these new programs chose structural arrangements to increase their share of public authority and to insulate their programs from political uncertainty of a one-party state, at the expense of promulgated aims such as conservation, local participation, and bureaucratic "efficiency."
The study underscores the importance of the distributive nature of public agencies, the political interests of bureaucrats, and the place of structural choice in policy analysis.

The use of common pool resources (CPRs) generally implies the existence of appropriation externalities. The externality studied in this paper arises because the cost of appropriation is a function of all players' appropriation. We derive the equilibrium predictions and conduct experiments for games in which the appropriation externality is either time independent or time dependent. In the repeated time independent CPR game the appropriation externality occurs as the cost of appropriation for each individual in a given decision round is a function of other individuals' appropriation in that round. In the time dependent game, individual appropriation costs are a function of appropriation of all individuals across all rounds, with the cost of appropriation increasing with the life of the CPR. This time dependency exacerbates the appropriation externality at the subgame perfect equilibrium, as appropriators race to utilize the resource. Finally, in a result reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons, the appropriation externality is exacerbated as the number of players rises. Preliminary results from experiments with two and five players are presented.

The basic incentive structure in social dilemmas (including public goods problems, commons dilemmas, N-person PD games) discourages cooperation. Moreover, in many groups and communities, even if one is persuaded that the public welfare requires a cooperative act, one may be dissuaded from cooperating because the impact of one's costly cooperative act on improving the public welfare may seem insignificant. That is, the efficacy of a cooperative act may be very low. In this presentation I review several results from my program of research examining the antecedents, consequences, and moderating effects of the efficacy of a cooperative act in providing a public good.
I begin by describing our basic experimental paradigm, a step-level public-goods game. Research employing this paradigm is then presented which shows that a) group members generally feel more self-efficacious in a smaller group (even when they actually are not) and b) that group members may downplay their sense of efficacy to rationalize their unwillingness to choose a costly cooperative act. In other studies, we have found enhanced beliefs in the collective efficacy of the group a) when the group is smaller (even under conditions where exactly the opposite is true), and b) when one's group has previously provided the public good (even under conditions where past success conveys no diagnostic information about the group's future behavior).
Although such effects on perceived efficacy are sometimes accompanied by parallel effects on cooperative behavior, this is not always the case. This raises the question of whether efficacy is an important mediator in determining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. To examine this question, we have altered our game paradigm to enable direct and strong manipulation of the efficacy of a cooperative choice. A pair of experiments is reported demonstrating that such manipulations exert a powerful, direct effect on cooperative behavior.
Finally, I develop an argument that the efficacy of cooperation ought to modify or moderate certain social dilemma remedies (viz., those which exert their influence by altering the value placed on the collective welfare; these are termed public good remedies), whereas efficacy should not moderate another type of remedy (viz., a remedy which offers incentives for a cooperative act, per se; these we term cooperation contingent remedies). This analytic approach is illustrated in three experiments which examine a) opportunities to discuss the public-good problem; b) enhancements of group identity/cohesiveness; and c) individual differences in social motivation. These analyses suggest that group discussion enhances cooperation due to promises to cooperate, that certain means to enhancing group identity seem to enhance concern with group welfare (although others do not), and that the basis for differences in cooperation between different social-motive groups depends upon whether a cooperation norm has been made salient.

Once a local government decides to provide a service, there are an array of alternatives for producing the service. In this presentation, I will present a general model of organizational choices for the production of public services; review several empirical studies of the contracting decisions of local governments in the U.S.; and discuss their implications for public policy as well as further research.
Production and transaction costs vary across the various organizational alternatives for public service production that a local government faces (internal, external public, external private nonprofit, and external for-profit). The model posits that local governments balance these two types of costs depending on the fiscal pressures they face and the political forces they confront.
Several empirical analyses of local government contracting decisions which draw on this model are presented. I will discuss studies that examine: (1) the propensity of local governments to contract; (2) local government choices between internal and external production for a set of specific services; and (3) organizational choices (internal public, external public, nonprofit and for-profit) that governments face.
Finally, insights and lessons from these studies and suggestions for future work on local government organizational choices for public service supply will be offered.

This paper discusses reform and organizational development (OD) in local government with reference to the fashion perspective on the rise in organizational studies of the public sector in Scandinavia. As a metaphor, the fashion model furnishes theories of public administration with a radical, new, and fresh interpretation of the reasons why we fail in our efforts to improve routines, leadership, management principles, and organizational forms in a deliberate way. But if the fashion logic can describe such phenomena, the meaning of reform and OD disappear. Like all models in the social sciences, the fashion perspective has important implications for what we see, what we oversee, and how we evaluate what we observe. My aim is to single out the more or less hidden norms in this perspective and to critique them. I find five important flaws in the fashion perspective: (1) a lack of orientation toward reality, (2) a reliance on a normative basis that is too narrow, (3) inadequate understanding of development, (4) inadequate understanding of intentionality and actors, and (5) no room for practice.

Like the great historical American and French experiments, the Russian experience also has a considerable general significance for the rest of world for several reasons. One--mostly analytical--is that Russian history was and still is the arena of persistent struggle between different patterns of social order, of dramatic attempts and failures to change politically dominant patterns. What was the reason for these repeated failures? Of course, many people before me have been puzzled about this sad enigma.
In search of a more appropriate way to answer this puzzle, I chose as a basic paradigm a permanent historical opposition of two archetypes: systemocentered and personocentered social ethics. A basic difference between them is the polarity of their scales of moral values concerning individual and society. In the framework of a personocentered scale, an individual is considered as a basic unit, "a measure for all subjects" (as the Greek philosopher Protagoras said). In the framework of a systemocentered scale, an individual is not taken into account as such, but only as a sort of tool for certain superindividual purposes. Beginning at some particular moment, human history can be, in principle, considered in terms of the relationships (always hostile) between these two archetypes. This approach fosters a deeper understanding of underlying reasons for many kinds of social and national conflicts.
In terms of this basic presupposition, I tried to conceptualize some key events in Russian history of the 17th-20th centuries and found several crucial "crossroads" where the way of Russian history had some chances to be changed in favor of the other, alternative way, when people found themselves in a situation of social choice.
The seventeenth century serves as a prototypical pattern for reflecting about subsequent developments because, like a "gene," it contained future tendencies and discrepancies. Early in the seventeenth century, during the so-called "Time of Troubles," the country had its first chance to turn towards the personocentered way but was absolutely unprepared for that possibility and rejected that opportunity. Towards the end of the century some premises for new patterns of public choice formed but the enforcement of autocracy patterns personified by Peter I as an efficient despot buried this second chance as well and, moreover, gave substantial new resources to a systemocentrical pattern of development. The next time that a public choice in favor of the latter occurred was in the 1760s, at the beginning of reign of Catherine II.
The nineteenth century proved to be the most dramatic. In the first quarter of that century, a real social base for the personocentered way had formed. This was the Russian intelligentsia. Also some other important steps in that direction have been taken. But the failed Decembrist attempt of coup d'etat ruined the chance again. The end of the reign of Alexander II proved to be a similar but even much more tragic opening for its historical consequences. Not only cultural and psychological but also very important institutional steps were undertaken then. A personocentered movement almost achieved a crucial point after which it should have become irreversible. After the assassination of the tsar, reaction prevailed anew. Another opportunity was ruined again.
The crucial factor of political life in the nineteenth century was the competition between two groups of Russian intelligentsia--liberal and radical. The former had elaborated moral principles and institutional arrangements for a personocentered way. The latter had actually perceived and constructed a new version of a systemocentered way, politically different in drawing support from a different strata of society but basically the same. The victory of the radical intelligentsia's ideology determined the more recent tragedies of Russian history.
I consider the period between 1881-1917 as a time that offered the best opportunities for taking a new path in public choice. But the main crossroad proved behind already and the road led downwards. Russian society was deeply split. The liberal intelligentsia in an alliance with gradually increased support of the other social forces were on the one side. The concentration of personocentered orientations mostly confined to one social stratum created a unique spiritual and intellectual pattern of worldwide importance; but selected pattern of support also became the source of further tragedies. Monarchy, revolutionary radicals, and most of other social groups stayed with the systemocentered scale of values. This latter had a much broader social support and prevailed in the end. That is why the political tools and economical advantages which Russia achieved in the beginning of the twentieth century was insufficiently deep in its patterns of modernization to change the pattern of order. The chance was lost again.
In the form of a Socialist political revolution, the traditional systemocentered pattern of order prevailed and was even reinforced. The historical alternative had been buried again. A pyramid of power was overturned and many changes on the political surface of events occurred. Basically the same pattern of political order remained intact. The so- called "Soviet" period proved to be the decline of the culture of the nation to the bottom of an "abyss." Now that period has, hopefully, come to an end.
At the present time, the country is passing through great turbulence at another crossroad in its historical destiny. Which public choice will be made at this time will determine the future course of the country at least for several decades ahead. Crossroads in history only occur at infrequent intervals.

A state that is strong enough to enforce property rights is also strong enough to confiscate property. We analyze this dilemma and ask the question: how can a (democratic) government commit to secure property rights? We use two models that build in an incentive for governments to fool economic agents into investing more than they otherwise would under perfect information. We show that the policy problem facing governments is time inconsistent, which indicates that credible commitment is indeed a dilemma. The first model focuses on choice of policy regime by a state and is most appropriate for understanding the policy dilemma facing undeveloped countries. The second model focuses on policy changes once a policy regime is established. This model is most useful for understanding the policy dilemma facing already-developed countries. We provide an empirical test for the second model, and then offer a discussion of the difficulty associated with making across time comparisons. We end with a discussion of potential institutional solutions to the economic development dilemma.

Voting institutions often play a central role in group decision making. In the research program we introduce in this presentation, we examine majority rule voting as an institution for alleviating inefficiencies in resource use in common pool resource (CPR) situations.
In particular, we plan to examine a decision situation in which a negative cost externality is produced as users of a common resource exploit the resource for their own use. When the default institution allows for no communication or other overt coordinating mechanisms between decision makers, we have observed (in prior experimental studies and in documented field studies) significant inefficiencies in resource use. In the research we initiate here, we turn to majority rule voting as an institution imposed to facilitate coordination over a more efficient group solution. In future research in this CPR decision setting, we will compare voting institutions to market institutions and to unstructured discourse.
Along with discussions of central theoretical and design issues, the colloquium presentation will involve a demonstration of the currently planned experimental protocol.

The first U.S. national debt (incurred mostly by the American Revolution, Louisiana Purchase, and War of 1812) was virtually paid off before 1837. Joseph Schumpeter's "fiscal sociology" perspective might promote understanding of that unique achievement, now hard even to imagine, for two reasons. First, it claims to fit best a pivotal era, which the first six decades of American nationhood certainly was. Second, it suggests that debt retirement may have been a symptom of processes that produced analogous social events. I nominate several institutional facts that may indicate more robust explanations of that policy's acceptance than can ideology or political rhetoric: constraining moral sentiments, restricted suffrage, Americanization of English law (especially of property and contracts, bankruptcy, charity, and inheritance), and deflationary expectations.

Many policy analyses related to infrastructure development in the developing world have emphasized technological fixes as the major policy tool. Policy actions based upon these analyses, however, have often brought about counterintuitive and counterintentional outcomes. Using irrigation governance and management in Nepal as the context, this paper argues that technological investments might exacerbate the asymmetries of interests and endowments among users of infrastructure. The increased asymmetries often dampen individuals' incentives to contribute to irrigation management. When such asymmetries are not coped with by effective institutional arrangements and the active organizing efforts of farmers of officials managing the systems, tail-end deprivation, lack of working orders in regard to water distribution and allocation, and underinvestment in maintenance are likely results. Empirical evidence from a large number of irrigation systems in Nepal is analyzed to substantiate the theoretical argument.

Since 1991, each of three species of salmon that spawn in the Snake River and its tributaries have been listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act. The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential of water markets to provide a substantial amount of water to aid salmon recovery efforts. Any water transferred from irrigation use and left in the river will benefit the salmon by improving migration conditions for juveniles as they head downstream to the ocean. This water also provides hydropower benefits, as water left in the river will be used to generate electricity. In this paper, it is shown that, especially during low flow years, the hydropower value of a substantial amount of irrigation water is larger than its agricultural value, even when the release of this water is shaped to meet the needs of the salmon rather than the hydropower producers.
While salmon advocates have not opposed water markets, they have argued that there is simply not enough water available to improve migration conditions enough to prevent the extinction of the Snake River salmon. For this reason, they have called for the drawdown of the reservoirs between the dams as a more effective means of improving migration conditions. Under this plan, no additional water would be needed for the salmon. This does not, however, diminish the argument for water markets in the region. In fact, because transferred water could be released to meet the needs of the hydropower producers rather than the salmon, the surplus generated by water markets would be substantially larger. Thus, regardless of which recovery plan is ultimately adopted, water markets can be used to improve the efficiency of water allocation, while helping, or at least not hurting, the endangered Snake River salmon.
Currently, water transfers can take place in the Snake River via the Idaho Water Bank. However, the restrictive rules of this water bank severely hamper the exchange of water for instream uses, such as hydropower production and salmon recovery efforts. In this paper, it is shown how the rules of the Idaho Water Bank could be changed to facilitate these transfers while protecting against third-party damages.

In this informal seminar, I will discuss some of the work we have been doing on the biological basis and evolution of animal decision- making under conditions of uncertainty. When animals are allowed to make choices over variable lotteries, they often perform in a risk-averse fashion, i.e., they choose the least variable option when options have equal expected value. We have been exploring the biological basis of this pattern of choice behavior in the bumble bee.
We use artificial flowers with known distributions of nectar rewards and consider the energetic criteria over which choice currencies can be constructed. We have found that bees consistently use a short-term energetic rate maximization criterion over long-term rates when forming preferences. Short-term rate maximization is consistent with some known aspects of bumble bee biomechanics and neurophysiology. The use of short-term rates rather than long-term rates may be adaptive within certain forms of spatial and temporal organization of the environment.
It is not inconceivable that the same ecological conditions that generate risk-aversion in bees (i.e., response to temporal and spatial structure within habitats and resources) are the same sorts of conditions that may generate risk-aversion in humans.

 We are honored to have the following distinguished scholars visiting the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis on February 27 and 28 to participate in a small planning session for future empirical research on the concept of Trust:

Valerie Braithwaite, Research Fellow, Administration, Compliance, and Governability Program, Australian National University.
Professor Karen Cook, Chairperson, Department of Sociology, University of Washington.
Professor Robert Frank, Department of Economics and Business, Cornell University.
Professor Margaret Levi, Department of Political Science, University of Washington.
Professor Toshio Yamagishi, Department of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University, Japan.

 NO PAPER FOR THIS SESSION.

The presentation covers a general approach to understanding clergy as local actors as developed in the dissertation Clergy at Work in the Secular City, and summarizes results from other chapters. The dissertation examines participation of clergy in local policy processes in Indianapolis in three general policy areas: low income assistance, crime prevention, and neighborhood development. The analysis distinguishes between action taken in partnership with government, action taken to influence government, and action taken to fulfill needs not adequately addressed by government. Clergy activities in local religious or secular organizations are included as is participation in government-sponsored settings.
The paper describes the general theoretical principles that guide the study. These principles structure the data analysis chapters so that the findings contribute to a theory of clergy as urban actors. The discussion of the theoretical components focuses on their part in answering the three core questions of this study:
1. What forms does this clergy participation take in an urban area?
2. How do differences in motivations and resources create different strategies of clergy action?
3. What do patterns of clergy participation teach us about urban politics and public policy?
Results from the data analysis chapters speak to more specific questions: What congregational and denominational variables influence patterns of involvement? What differences do characteristics in the neighborhood surrounding the church make on the way that a minister or rabbi chooses to relate to community efforts in the three policy areas? How does clergy activity relate to local government and nonprofit activity? Data come from a survey of clergy, census data, a citizen survey, and interviews with clergy and other local leaders.

The new institutional economics affords a powerful alternative to prevailing theories of culture and power in explaining legal pluralism. The management of transaction costs by individuals and groups creates a dialogic, mutually constitutive, relation between local, national, and transnational legal systems distinct from cultural heterogeneity and resistance to hegemonic power. This idea will be developed through an analysis of the interaction of local and state law in the evolution of property rights in water in the Orbigo valley of northwestern Spain. During the late Middle Ages, villages came together to divert water from the Orbigo river to irrigate their fields. To assign rights to the water, they drew on the structure of property rights encapsulated in the Siete Partidas, the legal code of Castilian Spain. Local law interacted with state law, however, to lower transaction costs by providing alternative, more efficient, sites to resolve conflicts and control free-riders and more finely discriminating two categories of water property poorly defined in Castilian state law, those pertaining to excess water and water mills.
The case presented here suggests that states can selectively refuse to intervene in the definition and defense of property rights, ceding de facto authority to local legal systems, even if their provisions are clearly at odds with state law. Allowing local legal arenas to define and defend property rights can dramatically reduce transaction costs for the state. Local legal arenas regulate, at low cost, non-market "transactional modes" (Polanyi) not only in stateless or so-called "primitive societies," but also in state societies. Local law has the potential to more fully operationalize property rights, adjusting them to local conditions and alternative forms of resource management. Over time, the state reaps the benefits of more efficient property rights and obtains precedents for the revision of state law and judicial procedure. One finds many examples of this alternative at work in common pool resource management in which property rights are defined and defended by local legal systems, in countries with colonial histories as well as North Atlantic countries.

Much work on how humans manage their common-pool resources, such as forests, has been framed in terms of Hardin's parable of the commons, where "rational" calculation of gains and losses for individual decision makers leads inexorably to overuse and ruin of resources. While this dilemma is often cast as one where cooperation is doomed in any confrontation with competition, case evidence is mounting of "real-world" local commons having endured over the ages. From a cognitive vantage, findings in decision theory suggest that people are often more concerned with reducing risk than maximizing gain. Especially in fragile ecosystems, where feedback on the effects of resource mismanagement is readily apparent, mechanisms for sharing risk may be the rule, not the exception. Moreover, as long as actors maintain intimate relations with one another and their environment, they appear less likely to aspire only to self gain at the expense of others. They are also less prone to treat non-substitutable, "context-sensitive" ecological resources as completely divisible and substitutable "context-free" items, like money.
Yet, often overlooked in general models of environmental management- -including commons studies--are the underlying roles of information and communication. For actors seldom uniformly share knowledge of resources, nor is such information generally transmitted without "noise" or modification. To remedy this oversight, we have begun using techniques to elicit the "mental models" that allow differential access to ecological information within and between distinct cultural groups acting in the same territory. These models are intended to reflect people's "tacit theories" of ecology. The information elicited targets conceptions of the causal role of species relationships, as well as edaphic and climatic zones, in "making the forest live" and on short- and long-term relationships between human activities and species viability. We have also begun modeling the "social networks" that communication of such information is likely to follow within and between groups in order to explore the implications of communication networks for commons management among groups.
Our underlying theoretical presumption is that commons problems result principally from breakdowns in the ways communities locally manage their common resources, not from an original lack of commons solutions. The looming tragedy is that even the most long-standing local commons do not seem able to survive the advent of an expanding global market economy rooted in the logic of maximizing individual gain. A central issue is why this is so and what it means for any attempt to extend the lessons of local commons to the avoidance of global tragedies. At present, no formal or practical solution exists to the problem of "upscaling the commons," perhaps in part because no long-term empirical studies of the problem yet exist.
With this in mind, we have chosen as the empirical focus of our research the long-term development of biological and cultural diversity in the Maya area of Mesoamerica. Although many commons cases involve low-density populations with low but constant-levels of productivity there appears to be no intrinsic limit on the size, density or productivity of successfully cooperating groups under conditions of environmentally reliable information, manageable channels of communication and sufficiently long time horizons. Maya civilization is a case in point.
Lowland Maya forests comprise one of the world's richest areas of biodiversity that has been under a continuous tradition of intensive cultural management spanning millennia. The United Nations has declared it "Humanity's Patrimony," and has the area as a cornerstone of the U.N. Biosphere Reserve Program. Mayaland offers a natural laboratory for the first long-range analysis of the cognitive and cultural dimensions of the commons breakdown in a key zone of biodiversity. Also motivating this focus is the imminent extinction that threatens the area's rich biodiversity and millennial resource-management culture. That is why the U.S. State Department, the World Bank, and many of the world's largest non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have given the area highest priority in their global attempts to preserve vital ecologies through "debt-for-nature" swaps and "sustainable development" programs. Still, a vicious cycle of deforestation and ecological degradation, community breakdown and political conflict spirals on downwards (e.g., the recent Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas and a renewal of violence in Guatemala). This poses a direct threat to regional stability, and is of increasing concern to the United States and the United Nations.

The ripples of the "third wave" of democratization have flowed over Africa since 1990, bringing with them renewed interest among Africans to open the public realm and place limits on the authoritarian regimes that rule over them. These democratic openings have been warmly received by western development assistance agencies, but have posed the challenge of how best to support this process. Most agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have concluded that active donor involvement can support and hasten this process. However, devising specific supporting activities has been hampered by the absence of a generally accepted theory of political development or democratic transition that could inform the articulation of strategies or the determination of priorities. Instead, a number of contending, and often simple-minded, approaches have emerged to guide democratization assistance activities.
Finding none of the existing approaches sufficiently rigorous or useful, USAID's Africa Bureau convened a group of scholars and consultants in late 1993 to devise a well-grounded "macro-political framework" that could be used to assess the status of democratization in a particular country, frame a democratization strategy, and identify priority activities for USAID and its local Mission. Though the working group was charged to draw on the extant approaches, the inclusion of a sizeable contingent of Workshoppers meant that the resulting framework would have a decidedly institutionalist cast. During this presentation, I will report on this group's 18 months of work--on both the resulting 'democratic disciplines' framework and the process used to develop and test it. Throughout I will stress the challenges we faced--both bureaucratic and intellectual--in attempting to apply institutional analysis at the macro-level of analysis.

Equal opportunity and representative bureaucracies have been on the policy agenda for the United States for several decades. Yet, in 1995 both representative bureaucracy and demographic parity for women and minorities throughout government agencies and hierarchies remain elusive; and citizens are increasingly disillusioned as initiatives in California challenging the validity of the established equal opportunity/affirmative action approach illustrate. The traditional explanations--variations in human capital, socialization and sociopsychological characteristics, and standard systemic variables [e.g., occupational sex segregation, limited access to training, mentors, education, credentialing, etc.]--appear unable to explain fully why the implementation of equal opportunity policies is so uneven and difficult within government, while at the same time a sense of unfairness permeates the process.
In reviewing the literature on why such difficulties exist, it is evident that several theoretical assumptions about bureaucracies and how to analyze the results of equal opportunity efforts are clouding our perceptions. The general Weberian principle that bureaucracies are essentially unisex, although challenged in feminist theoretical writings, still undergirds empirical analyses. For example, Frederickson's (1990) compound theory of social equity, widely used, focuses attention on block and segmented equality within an organization. Block equality focuses on the total organization; e.g., state government, or particular departments or agencies. Segmented equality focuses on the horizontal, hierarchical levels. It is the latter type of analyses that reveal how few women are at the upper- echelons of government. Although these analyses have been useful in identifying the various glass ceilings and glass walls existing in government, they have not advanced new policy solutions for rectifying the lack of equality of results that still need addressing. Nor have they encouraged the incorporation of systemic and organziational variables into analyses of the outcome of equal opportunity policies. Without the refined perspective analyses these latter variables bring, however, progress will not take place in understanding existing gender, racial, and ethnic distributions in government or why particular patterns of equal opportunity outcomes prevail. It is my contention that a better understanding of the current results of past efforts to implement equal opportunity policies and representative bureaucracies, at least for women, will be attained if we merge institutional and organizational analyses and our knowledge of the gendered nature of the economy with policy outcome analyses.
In my presentation I will discuss the following: First, I intend to demonstrate that U.S. affirmative action policies are grounded not only in an assimilationist model of a universal worker but also that they have depended on a Weberian rational-bureaucratic structure. As that structure has been penetrated by women and minorities, the need to reconsider organizational and bureaucratic paradigms has sharpened, as has the necessity to develop new analytical tools to address the issues. Second, I will show that existing analyses of affirmative action success, grounded in difference analyses, are insufficient for workplace issues of the 1990s. The main concern has been how do males and females or blacks (or nonwhites) and whites compare in status, position, and income. This type of analysis is helpful to track the success or failure of AA in increasing access, but it does little to enhance understanding of what happens in the workplace to the structures and institutional interactions and policy outcomes when a critical mass of women and minorities develops. The Weberian rational bureaucratic model would suggest that these new individuals ought to be interchangeable with the previous white male holders. Empirical data indicate that few believe that to be the case. With the arrival of a critical mass of nonwhite and/or nonmale newcomers, the core of an institution's culture, practices, and masculinist assumptions are penetrated to such an extent that they become too weak to operate as they previously did. Hence, confusion and hostility in the workplace increase. Third, I will discuss how more complex gendered-based organizational and institutional analyses are needed in the 1990s to address the reality men and women of all races and ethnicities currently face. These gendered organizational analyses require moving from assumptions about sex difference to assumptions about gender power. (This approach probably can be applied to racial and ethnic subgroups but I will not have time to do that in this presentation.) I will also present an outline and examples of the elements of this new approach. Finally, I suggest that this alternative research approach as well as a multicultural synergistic conceptual framework are good points of departure in our attempts to address U.S. diversity problems in the twenty-first century.
In sum, the 1990s problem of increasing and coping with diversity is very different from the 1960s problem of increasing access and equal opportunity. In the 1960s, it seemed reasonable to base AA policy on the assumption that white males and the institutions they run could simply assimilate women and minorities. In the 1990s, in many but far from all agencies, sufficient numbers of women and minorities have been hired so that the welcoming committee has changed. As a result, two basic questions face the nation in the 1990s: (1) Will we be able to continue equal opportunity and AA in areas still closed to women and minorities? (2) How can we all collectively and collaboratively improve the interface and interrelationship of men and women and of all subgroups with all other subgroups so that rational policies and effective action can be taken by an organization? If no one group can effectively assimilate the others and continue as though nothing has changed, then how do we proceed?

In 1980, a government report indicated that 14 percent of working people in Malaysia were government servants. Although realizing that this was a burden, not many drastic changes took place until the recession of 1985-86. Although the first privatization activity was in 1983, the process was slow, and by 1989, only 23 such activities were recorded. But since then it has gained momentum, and by 1993, 80 more privatized activities had been completed. The one million government employees in 1980 was reduced by a tenth in 1993.
This study, which started in 1984, was focused on strategic management practices and issues. But development since then has given the study some added dimensions of interest, especially in the areas of restructuring and reorganizing which was not of interest before. Before, employment generation, income distribution, and development expenses were given emphasis but now it is self-financing and the bottom line that matters.
This paper looks only at some aspects of restructuring, especially in the physical structure and its characteristics and what were the dominant causes for such restructuring. Data were gathered every two years, while the enterprises progress and development were monitored at least once a year. Those presented in this paper were for every five years.
The findings seem to indicate that although the eleven enterprises were different in many aspects of their activities, some common factors seemed to dominate in influencing them towards certain types of restructuring. Factors like international competition, reliance on government funding, levels of autonomy, diversity of activities, and state of proactiveness seemed to play influential roles. The enterprises are different today than they were ten years ago except for three; and they are to be closed--was that because they did not change?

The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct annual auctions of sulfur dioxide emission allowances. Under the discriminative auction rules, sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. This presentation summarizes two laboratory experiments that evaluate this new trading institution. The first experiment implements a one-sided version of the auction to focus on the institution's seller incentives. Consistent with theoretical predictions, sellers offer allowances at prices below their emission control costs, auction outcomes are inefficient and increasing the number of sellers further reduces offer prices. The second experiment compares a two-sided version of the EPA auction with the more commonly observed uniform price call auction. This comparison reveals that the uniform price auction is more efficient and provides more accurate price information than the EPA auction.

The twentieth century was the age of ideology. The twenty-first century that began in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR is bound to be the age of nationalism. Nationalism is not an ideology--it is an assertion of the natural collective identity of every people and of each individual within it. There is nothing ideological in seeking for one's nation an appropriate place within the global community of nations, although, since nationalisms very often clash, the nations that are parties to such clashes need to elaborate ideas which would make their particular claims and stances presentable as just and based on universal right.
Nationalism usually expresses itself in claiming for the nation it speaks the right to free self-determination and sovereignty. The conflicts and clashes between nationalisms usually arise, however, not from this claim of them all as such but from the extent to which that claim is made and, thus, from how it affects similar claims of other nations. The disputes between established nations center mainly on territorial issues (sovereignty over; possession of, free passage through or special rights for access to, et al.) but most national conflicts are between non-sovereign, stateless nations and those nations who claim sovereign authority over them. These conflicts are centered around the issue of recognition by established nations of peoples considering themselves to also be nations, but as yet denied the status of nationhood equal to that which their sovereign counterparts in the world already enjoy.
In this paper the discussion centers around the concept of nationhood, the causes and the nature of national conflicts, the perils these conflicts present to the new post-communist world order, and the possibilities of satisfactory accommodation of the conflicting national interests into a universal and harmonious world order system. The conclusion is that such an accommodation is possible, provided the democratic nations could arrive at, and abide by, certain fair principles of international justice.
The first such principle, in the author's view, would be the unequivocal recognition to every territorial nation of the world the right of self-determination and sovereignty within that nation's historic homeland. (That would include the right of return to their original historic homelands of indigenous people forcefully deported from these homelands.)
Once the nation is thus established as a sovereign entity, territorial disputes between it and adjacent nations should be solved not on the basis of "historic rights," however objective and justified the claims to such rights may be, but on the basis of the demographic principle, which is to say that the fate of a disputed territory should be decided by that territory's population's majority exercising its right to self-determination on it.
Exception from the rule of applying the demographic principle may be made only with regard to some specific territorial entities without which the nation is unable to properly constitute itself and retain its integrity (for example, the nation's historic capital city, its holy and other symbolic places without which the nation cannot even be identified as a historically, culturally, or demographically consistent body of people).
Finally, national minorities--that is, nationalities who either do not possess a territorial identity at all or who identify themselves territorially not so much with their own nation's territory but with the territory of another nation to which they lay no claim but in which they are rightfully entitled and prefer to live as loyal and law-abiding citizens--should be granted full citizenship rights, equal to those of the members of the main nation, and, in addition, they should enjoy all the specific cultural and religious rights befitting them as ethnically distinct communities within another nation's state.
In the author's view, the twenty-first century will be marked by much national unrest, rebellion, and warfare, but, by the end of it, the peoples of the world--and, accordingly, their governments, too--sick and tired of all these endless skirmishes, will have, however grudgingly, to agree to these or a consistent set of accordingly modified, though in substance similar, principles and thus finally establish a harmonious and peaceful world order, that is such a universal system which would be based on the recognition and resolute defence of inalienable human rights of each individual and each nation, which, after all, is nothing else but a collective personality and by that also a uniquely individual entity.