

On Williamson's Arguments that Knowledge is a Mental State

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Abstract

In *Knowledge and Its Limits*, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and non-mental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the non-analyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the “primeness” of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the “internal” element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the way to a cogent argument that knowledge is *not* a purely mental state.