

**EDUCATING THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN:
EDUCATION, POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY,
AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS**

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In 2007, an adaptation of the play *Class Enemy* premiered in Sarajevo. The original, 1978 version of the play by Nigel Williams is set in a classroom in Brixton, an area of London that had a large Afro-Caribbean population. In the play, the teachers fail to appear one day, and so the students gradually organise themselves, and in some senses create a classroom that reflects their experiences of the dysfunctional society that has cast them off. They barricade themselves into their room, and teach “lessons” of brutality and tragedy. The adaptation in Sarajevo focuses on the violence that permeates the city and schools, and the attitudes that have been shaped by ethnic cleansing, war, and massacre. In preparation, actors and the director spent time in Bosnian schools, picking up stories and language to insert into the adaptation. The result is a reflection both of the horror that has infused Bosnian life and culture, and the experiences of young people who do not recall life before the war. An article about the play in *The Guardian* quotes a man from Tuzla who was ten years old when the war began:

“Lots of families have someone whose bones were never found. I went to a psychologist to ask what I could do about my anxiety attacks—I see pictures in my head of the war, the bloody bodies. She said I would just have to live with it.” He brought his mother, a secondary school teacher, to see the play. “My ma was shocked by the rudeness of it and said she couldn’t feel her legs after. But what most shocked her was how close her to experience of the classroom it was.” (Connolly, 2008, 27)

This is probably not the introduction that one anticipates for a paper on citizenship education, but the example illustrates what is at stake in citizenship education in the context of democratic transitions. What seems to be rather straightforward—teaching basics of civics, democracy, and the values and behaviours associated with citizenship—inevitably has to confront the histories that children, parents, and teachers have lived. Many traditions of democracy implicitly assume a universality or that democracy and citizenship are built around core elements or core principles that are unchanging from place to place, from context to context. But how would students in Brixton, the original setting, interpret and make sense of lessons about equality, confronting as they do racism

and material *inequality*? How would students in Sarajevo make sense of lessons about respect and deliberation after living through a brutal war and the on-going difficulties of forging a sense of mutuality and community?

My focus in this paper, then is not on curriculum materials and lesson plans, but on the contexts of transition and the ways in which citizenship education is used—and perhaps manipulated—by governments to create particular kinds of citizens that suit the national stories and imaginations governments hope to foster. In this way, citizenship education should be seen as a tool in nation- and polity-building; it is one component of a suite of practices associated with social reproduction and citizenship formation (Marston and Mitchell, 2004).

There are a variety of ways that citizenship education is delivered. In some countries with a national curriculum, and for some purposes, it is an explicit part of the curriculum and there is a subject or content area with that label. In other countries, there might not be a specific content area, but policy directives direct schools to teach certain principles. In still other circumstances, educational practices are justified in terms of the things citizens (including youth and adults) should know; in these circumstances, it is sometimes easier to think about education *for* citizenship, rather than to conceptualise citizenship education as being about government and politics. Two characteristics unite these diverse practices. The first is the central role that education broadly understood is held to play in the construction of citizenship and of a citizenry. The second is the ways that citizenship education—however defined or implemented—provides an insight into the negotiations between abstract theories and ideals about democracy and the nitty-gritty of democratic transitions in real places, with real histories, and real problems.

The paper begins with a short discussion about the purpose of citizenship education, and then reviews some of the literature on education and transitions to democracy. Reflecting a belief that democracy is never settled and that transitions are never concluded, I also consider the roles of citizenship education in transitions within countries generally considered to be democratic. By way of conclusion, the paper addresses a set of issues, such as the ones raised in the two versions of *Class Enemy*, that pose challenges for citizenship education in building sustainable democracies.

Why Citizenship Education?

The importance of education for democracy is hard to overstate. If, as many would argue, the goals of democracy are self-development, well-being, and the good life, then

education is critical (Young, 2000; Gould, 2004). We can see this in the vision of American citizenship held by people such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Rush. Education was from the very beginning part of a project that linked citizenship formation and the development of the polity to individual self-development and nation building (although those terms would not have been used). The goal was to ensure that a new kind of political subject capable of functioning as a democratic citizen would be formed through an educational system open to all (or at least all white males). The most important skills for these subjects did not involve political and moral philosophy, however, so much as they involved animal husbandry, the ability to do sums, and so forth that would enable Americans to function as autonomous subjects (Shklar, 1996). Moral values were not completely ignored, of course, as moral and character education has been linked to citizenship in one way or another since Confucius and Aristotle. Societies, including democratic societies, need people who will behave according to moral principals, and more importantly, according to some, people who behave according to *shared* or *common* moral principles that might be thought of as a public morality (as distinct from a personal morality) (Dewey, 1916/1997; Callan, 1997; Sehr, 1997; Youniss and Yates, 1999; Althof and Berkowitz, 2006; Bull, 2006).

Moral values are not the primary focus of most contemporary citizenship education programmes, however. Instead, the curriculum is often focused on substantive content areas, emphasising civics, the structure of government, history, and discussion of public issues. Curricula also often try to inculcate habits of participation and “active citizenship” through service learning requirements. When values are discussed, it is typically in the context of a specific national history or identity, such as in Britain, where citizenship education is supposed to address specifically *British* values. In so doing, the intent is to forge a feeling of being in a common project shared by citizens and often a feeling of pride or patriotism. While educational philosophers and theorists draw a distinction between patriotism and nationalism, this distinction is often blurred in practice, and citizenship education becomes, in one way or another, an element of nation-building (Dale, 1981; Osler and Starkey, 2005; Bridgehouse, 2006).

A great deal of the citizenship education literature focuses on curricula and educational systems, but that is not the focus of the rest of this paper. Instead, I start from the proposition that changing relationships between economic, political and social contexts influence the meaning and potential of citizenship and the kinds of polities that educational systems are intended to shape. Because of this, Bridgehouse (2006) argues

that curricula and educational practices may well be the least important factors in conditioning the outcomes of citizenship education. And while the well being of individual citizens may be the stated goal of education, states also seek to shape and maintain a political community capable of being governed and of being economically productive (Mitchell, 2003)¹. Education generally, but citizenship education in particular, then, needs to be conceptualised as a means of regulation (Dale, 1981; Kaplan, 2006) in which discipline is attempted at a societal level. In this way, far from reflecting universal or abstract principles advanced in some theories of democracy, citizenship education reflects the path dependency of democratization processes in specific countries (Karl, 1990), as well as the conditions under which states operate and the challenges they confront at a given time (Mitchell, 2003).

Citizenship Education and Transitions to Democracy

Most transitions to democracy come after a period of violence of some form.

Sometimes the violence is between organised military forces, sometimes it is conducted by militias. Sometimes the violence comes as part of a liberation struggle, sometimes the violence is perpetrated by states against their own people. In some cases the violence is physical, but it is often a violence associated with fear and oppression. One of the immediate tasks for emerging democracies is to construct a new national story and a new national imagination that can unite and, perhaps optimistically, heal the country, and to resituate the country in the world. This happens in any number of ways, but the education system is clearly an important component, as the schools are used to promote a vision of the country's history and to train the students who will emerge from their studies with a particular set of skills capable of acting on that vision. An example might help to ground this discussion.

In post-Apartheid South Africa, education policies designed to enhance citizenship are intended to create citizens who embody particular goals. These goals include: citizens with a sense of social justice; productive citizens with skills for a global market; and healthy citizens who embody (literally) values and behaviours such that they can meet their responsibilities to their families, communities, and nation. In the

¹ There is a large and growing literature on the political economy of citizenship (Sandel, 1996) and the efforts of states to mould citizens to meet those changing requirements. Much of this literature, however, is not directly concerned with citizenship education, but takes a broader view on the expectations of the state in different economic conditions, and particularly in the context of neoliberalism (e.g., Rose, 1999; Isin, 2004; Ilcan and Basok, 2004; Ong, 2006; Ranciere, 2007).

discussion of these goals and in the strategies to meet them, race and racialised histories play no obvious role. Rather, education for citizenship is forward looking, and the vision included in policy statements and in curriculum goals is of a country in which *all* citizens can lead fulfilling lives. Globalisation, re-entry into the international community, and stemming HIV/AIDS are important in the policy documents, not memories of the anti-Apartheid struggle or the ongoing reality of a society deeply divided along racial and economic lines. Debates over affirmative action surface in politics and in schools (Hammett, 2008), but they are absent from the policy documents (Hammett and Staeheli, 2009).

The political economic context in which South Africa must build its future is clear in the documents, and so South Africa must be outward looking to develop. If the country is to take its rightful place in the global economy, students must learn skills to be competitive as workers and perhaps as leaders of new businesses (McGrath, 2005). South African business newspapers are full of articles tracing the success of workers, addressing the difficulties firms have in keeping good workers in the country, and reminding readers of the need for further training in skills to keep firms competitive. They are also highly critical of any whiff of positive discrimination or of affirmative action—policy initiatives that would be in response to a racialised past—arguing that the economy *requires* a society in which race is not a factor in obtaining jobs or in promotion. The new economy, in other words, requires the post-racial society that the anti-Apartheid movement envisioned. The national history regarding race, they argue, is best put to the side in both education policy and in the curriculum.

Similarly, the emphasis on health behaviours reflects the tremendous personal, communal, and national costs incurred by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is currently estimated that the country spends about 11% of GDP on health costs and that HIV/AIDS alone will depress GDP growth by about 17% by 2010 (Chetty, 2007)². While the personal costs may be most heavy in black African communities, the societal costs and the financial burden are borne more widely. In linking citizenship to health behaviours, education policy promotes a vision of a shared fate. The policies direct educators to talk about health as an obligation of citizens to maintain a healthy body as part of a body politic that can move the country forward. In that move, national history and the reasons why HIV/AIDS disproportionately affects some national bodies more than others is not addressed. Instead, and by implication, it is as though fostering

² These figures predate the current financial crisis.

healthy, productive and globally competitive young citizens will provide a means of moving beyond the conflicts and violence of the past.

In general and certainly in South Africa, it seems that there are two impulses—and to some degree strategies—for promoting new subjectivities through the educational system. One is expressed in the promotion of a cosmopolitan identity for citizens of the new democracy. Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkley are two British academics who both theorise and advise on citizenship education in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Osler and Starkley argue that cosmopolitanism offers a way to be “a citizen at any level, local, national, regional or global. It is based on feelings of solidarity with fellow human beings wherever they are situated.... Cosmopolitan citizens process their multiple identities... In so doing, cosmopolitan citizens recognize others as essentially similar to themselves and arrive at a sense of citizenship based on consciousness of humanity rather than on allegiance to a state” (2005, p. 23). As such, cosmopolitanism can offer a way to help students process their identities and experiences in ways that do not dwell on differences, but rather highlight their connections to other students, to people who might have been part of an oppressive regime, to people who might have different racial backgrounds or religious beliefs, and to see them as humans with shared aspirations (see also Gutmann, 1987; Turner, 2002; Bridgehouse, 2006; Benhabib, 2007; Kiwan, 2008). These connections should provide a way to work together in building a new, democratic society with a shared fate. Rather than fostering a sense of a national society, however, such practices would foster a sense of a “learning society” (Jarvis, 2000; Popkewitz, et al., 2006) and perhaps a global citizenship (Roman, 2003).

The promotion of cosmopolitanism, however, would seem to be at odds with a second goal of citizenship education, which is to instil a national story and identity. History, for example, is commonly listed as one of the subject areas comprising citizenship education, because it is a way to highlight the shared history that shapes the political subjectivity of citizens. From a practical perspective, it is not clear why governments would want to promote a post-national or non-national form of citizenship associated with cosmopolitanism; typically, they are more concerned to create a shared narrative of nation and polity. In unravelling this puzzle, it is worthwhile remembering that governments are fragmented, rarely consistent and have multiple goals that *are* contradictory. In the context of a transition to democracy, governments will want to ensure that youth have the skills to become self-supporting, responsible citizens who can

help the country compete in the global economy. As I argued through the South African example, the national story may be unimportant in achieving that goal, and it may even be a barrier when it comes to educating an economically competitive citizenry. But it is also useful to remember that governments are not the only agents involved in public education. In many democratising countries, international NGOs play an important role in developing curricula for citizenship education and in promoting “active citizenship” to build social capital (McClenaghan, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Muck, 2004), and they seem to be particularly strong advocates for different forms of cosmopolitanism. Again, an example demonstrates why this might be the case.

A consultant working with an education NGO in Bosnia described the struggles he confronted as the organisation (with funding from a large US-based foundation promoting democracy) tried to persuade education officials to avoid mention of ethnic cleansing in their new curriculum³. Rather than describing the country as forged through war, he argued they needed to build solidarity and a new identity by promoting a sense of common purpose through local action. He described this as an attempt to promote a form of cosmopolitanism, in which feelings of belonging were not vested in ideas of nation. Yet he worried that the memory of conflict made such efforts seem hopelessly and naively optimistic, and that other elements of school curricula continued to promote a national history and story in which ethnic and religion oppression were the crucibles in which the nation was forged. He embarked on a three-pronged strategy of trying to tone down the nationalist elements of the history curriculum, introducing discussions about human rights, and promoting a programme of active citizenship in which community service and local participation were prominent. His hope was that this strategy would merge the production of social capital and a sense of citizenship in a way that made national history seem less relevant to today’s challenges and that emphasised the importance of working together to address immediate needs. In other words, he sought to recognise the history, but to provide a structure in which the history would not determine the future.

The linkage between cosmopolitanism, social capital formation, and citizenship education is strong in the grey literature in citizenship education and in the discussions of curricular goals and strategies in the academic literature. These literatures are not my direct focus at this point; their significance is in the way they are used on the ground by

³ This example comes from an interview in which the respondent was promised confidentiality for himself and his organisation.

those who develop curricula in ways that may seem contrary to states' interests. What this suggests is that there are important gaps between educational philosophy, theory and practice. To understand those gaps, it is necessary to recognise the different conceptualisations of democracy and citizenship education mobilised by agents and institutions, and the different interests and goals they may hold. Perhaps even more importantly, the dilemma faced by NGOs and others is that citizenship education is not (or perhaps *should* not) be simply a matter of designing and implementing a curriculum that is rooted in philosophy and theory. For citizenship education to play a role in developing sustainable democratic values and practices, it has to be cognizant of the experiences that students, teachers, and parents bring to the process. While national histories and nationalist identities may hinder the development of a new basis for social solidarity and identity, seeming to deny history and its role in structuring the contexts of democratization is equally problematic (Staheli, forthcoming).

Citizenship Education and Transitions *within* Democracies

Transitions do not just occur *to* democracy, but also occur *within* democracies in response to changing economic, political and social conditions within and outwith countries. In response to those changes, many established democracies are also in the midst of designing—and in some cases, redesigning—citizenship education policies. Much of the literature in this area comes from Britain and other countries within the European Union as they respond to challenges to national citizenship posed by immigration, post-colonialism, and the development of the European Union (Kuhn and Sultana, 2006; Shaw, 2007). In many ways, the challenges that established democracies face are similar to those newly emerging democracies: they need to provide the skills and training that will make future citizens productive and economically self-sufficient; instil values of self-reliance (or at least non-reliance on government); and establish habits of participation in particular kinds of activities that reflect the values of citizenship in a given context. The ways in which these issues are talked about are somewhat different in established democracies than in emerging democracies, however.

An important strand of the research on the economic dimensions of citizenship in established democracies has been couched in terms of neo-liberalism; much of this research is avowedly critical and is often linked to radical views of democracy (e.g., Mouffe, 2000; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Mitchell, 2003, 2006; Dikeç, 2005; Fyfe, 2005; Ong, 2006; Ranciere, 2007; Rose, 2007; Purcell, 2008). This literature argues that

states conceptualise the ideal citizen as one who makes few demands on the state and who is a willing and compliant worker. As such, states try to instil values promoting work and self-reliance and they push programmes to address those people who are not in employment, education, or training, or in the British lingo, who are NEET.⁴ “Further” or “technical” and “vocational” education programmes, often aimed at adults facing redundancy, have also been developed. Not formally part of citizenship education curricula, these programmes are aimed at developing skill sets so that individuals can act on the values learned in school. In this sense (and in a context where there is a formal citizenship education curriculum), these programmes are examples of education *for* citizenship.

A second set of values imparted through citizenship education programmes has to do with the importance of participation or “active citizenship.” (Gamarnikow and Green, 1999; Pykett, forthcoming). Citizenship education programmes often promote active citizenship as a way of building social capital and social solidarity and thereby providing the grounds by which divisions within societies can be healed. These efforts are similar to the efforts within emerging democracies, although the turn toward cosmopolitanism takes a different form. It is often an economic cosmopolitanism, emphasising global competitiveness, that is nevertheless grounded in community and locality; the wariness of the nation that is apparent in some emerging democracies is muted, or in some cases, completely absent. Bob Jessop (200_) describes the overall governance effort as being a combination of neo-liberalism and a kind of neo-communitarianism in which the values of market and community are merged in the creation of citizens who make few demands on the state (see also Fyfe, 2005; Staeheli, 2008). In this context, citizenship education is one of a broad array of techniques for making citizens governable within established democracies (Pykett, 2007).

As noted above, there is less hesitancy about promoting a national identity in some of the established democracies for two reasons. First, many governments in the European Union are at pains to balance a European identity with a national identity. Education is one of the policy domains that remain with national governments, and few governments are willing to subsume national identity in educational policy. A similar process is evident with regard to other supranational organisations, though few have the powers of the EU. Second, in the case of confederations or composite states such as

⁴ See the description of the programmes addressed to deal with NEET teens as part of the Every Child Matters Policy at <http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/ete/neet/>

Switzerland and the United Kingdom, national governments negotiate a complex array of educational structures and systems that have considerable power regarding curriculum and educational practices. In Britain, for example, each of the constituent, or “home,” nations has their own educational system, with some requirements from the parliament in Westminster overlain (Andrews and Mycock, 2007). In this context, promoting an idea of a nation takes on different implications than it does in countries with recent experience of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

These issues have been important in the way citizenship education is conceptualised and implemented in established democracies, but they are not typically the subject of fierce political or public debate. Probably the most pressing issue that has spurred citizenship education policies—and that has been in the political limelight in many countries—is the perceived threat to the nation and to citizenship posed by multiculturalism. Throughout the western democracies, socio-cultural changes brought about by immigration are blamed for fragmenting communities along the lines of race, ethnicity, and religion in ways that are dangerous for democracy (Huntington, 2004; but see Gutmann, 2003 and Parekh, 2006)⁵. Critics charge that multiculturalism in schools allows immigrants and others who are “different” to remain isolated linguistically, academically, and socially and to excuse poor performance (Glazer, 1997). The effect, they argue, is to turn difference into disadvantage at an individual level and to create new fissures in the society as a whole. In some countries, the flash point for debate seems to revolve around headscarves (Bowen, 2007; Gökariksel and Mitchell, 2005), in the US it is language (Portes and Rumbaugh, 2006), in Britain, it is about religion and national values (Nesbitt and Henderson, 2003). These arguments have been hotly disputed, leading some politicians and scholars to try to reorient the debate on democratic values that are shared, even in the midst of social and cultural differences. A cross-national study of student attitudes does suggest some narrowing of attitudes toward democracy and civic behaviours amongst students who have been exposed to citizenship education programmes (Janmaat, 2008). Yet scholars such as Wendy Brown (2006) have argued that discourses about shared national values—and particularly discourses of tolerance—and convergence in values should not be taken as unquestioned indicators of citizenship.

⁵ Aboriginal or First Nations populations might reasonably make the same claim against white settlers. William Kymlicka, one of the most prominent theorists promoting multiculturalism limits his arguments to First Nations people, in some cases disavowing their applicability to immigrants (Kymlicka, 1995; see Benhabib (2002) and Phillips (2007) for a fuller analysis.

These discourses, she argues, serve to mask processes of exclusion that operate at a societal level, and in so doing, firmly assign to individuals the responsibility to integrate and to take on those values.

The difficulty may once again be best explored through an example. Abu el-Haj (2007) conducted an ethnographic study with Palestinian students in an American high school. She noted that these students—some of whom were born in the US, and most of whom held American citizenship—never felt American, and that the feeling of not being American was intensified after 9/11. Citizenship, she argued, was something the student relied upon, but was not an identity they inhabited. Part of the problem was their experience, not just in the city in which they lived, but also in the classes and school, and in their interactions with students, teachers, and administrators. These students recounted racist statements and acts that, they argued, would never be tolerated if they were levelled against blacks or whites. These experiences stood in stark opposition to the discourse of civility, tolerance, inclusion, and shared American values that they were hearing in the classroom and that politicians were preaching. Many students silenced themselves as means of protection, but they never “fit in” and often remained separate from non-Palestinian students. In this context, the daily experience of students could not be reconciled with discourses of tolerance; the disconnection was too great. Their apparent aloofness was read as their individual refusal to integrate and to accept American values, rather than as an indication of the level of societal tolerance and openness. As Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) have argued, we need to see assimilation and integration as something that majority societies allow, rather than simply as something that immigrants and others who are “different” are responsible for doing. Taking this argument to the educational realm, citizenship education practices that promote philosophical ideals without accounting for the daily life that students live will stigmatise students who feel their experiences are not fully accounted in the national story. Such practices may well fail in the goal of training new, democratic citizens.

Citizenship Education and Democratic Transitions: An Agenda for Sustainable Democracy?

All transitions are complex and fraught, but democratic transitions may be particularly difficult because it is not possible to start from the proverbial “clean slate.” Histories and geographies are implicated in the problems transitions confront, and the resources and abilities individuals, communities, and nations can bring to the process.

Furthermore, transitions almost by definition occur in the context of shifting political, economic, and social conditions that are overlain on those individual and national histories. Citizenship education can be thought of as an attempt to remake those histories by teaching students new stories and giving them the tools to live as a new kind of citizen. But the preceding pages should have highlighted how difficult that is, even in established democracies. It seems that there are too many different theories of democracy and citizenship being mobilised, too many different interests and goals, and too many histories and experiences. By way of conclusion, I hope to isolate four interlinked issues that should be addressed if we are to progress our understanding of sustainable democratic transitions. Moving forward on each of these requires an appreciation of the situated nature of democracy and citizenship and of the ways that education can intervene in practice to advance theoretical and philosophical ideals.

The first issue revolves around the role that memory and history play in consolidating democracy. As I have argued, democratic transitions do not simply wipe away the memory of conflict and oppression; indeed, given the uncertain nature of transitions, it is unwise to expect that transitions described as democratic will eliminate actual conflicts and oppression. Truth and reconciliation commissions and memorialisations have been common strategies to recognise suffering and to encourage healing, but their effects are not clear. Furthermore, many educators worry about the efficacy of those strategies for young people, whom it is hoped can be raised to be post-conflict citizens. Yet as the two versions of *Class Enemy* and the audience reception to them suggests, youth have their own experiences of conflict and the aftermath of conflict. Those experiences are further interpreted by their parents and teachers, and by interactions in their communities and daily lives. To be effective, calls to cosmopolitanism, active citizenship and a new national identity have to be reconciled with the experiences and subjectivities of youth. Empirical research showing a convergence in attitudes about how democracy is defined does not necessarily mean that youth feel included in democratic communities and in the new stories that are told about their country, whether they are cosmopolitan, multicultural, neo-nationalist, or some hybrid.

Second, but related, citizenship education programmes in and of themselves are not sufficient to overcome the inequalities and processes of marginalisation that are seem endemic to all countries and that limit inclusion in the democratic public (Lister, 2008). The bases for inequality and for the feelings of exclusion that often accompany inequality

are many, including poverty, gender, religion, and processes of racialisation. Furthermore, the bases of marginalisation are interlinked, positioning subjects in webs of relative privilege and marginalisation within a complex public sphere (Fraser, 1990; Lister, 1997; Warner, 2002; Iveson, 2007). Adding another layer of complexity to this, however, is that there are different ways of understanding marginalisation, different ways of thinking about inclusion; the definitions of democracy and inclusion in liberal democracy do not exhaust all possibilities. This issue is particularly important as international NGOs and other agents work with governments as they try to conceptualise and work to consolidate citizenships that reflect the histories, cultures and needs of different countries and as they respect the human rights and well being of differently positioned citizen subjects (Benhabib, 2002; Gould, 2004; Brown, 2006; Phillips, 2007).

Third, the issue of religion and secularism requires attention. Much has been made about the secular basis of democracy and the challenge that religiosity may (or may not) pose (Taylor, 2007). Citizenship in the West is often described as a secular identity, but religion's importance in the public realm is nevertheless quite strong. There are many, for instance, who believe Muslims should not play a prominent role in politics or in government, and many Christians who base their political viewpoints on their religion, and fundamentalism in many religions seems to be on the rise. This is as true in formally secular societies as it is in countries with a state-sponsored religion, and as true of established democracies as in emerging democracies. If democratic citizenship is to provide a meaningful identity for citizens—in the West and beyond—the relationship between religion and democracy needs further attention at philosophical and empirical levels.

Finally, and coming full circle, it remains to be seen whether cosmopolitanism provides the antidote to nationalism or to deeply rooted social divisions, and can therefore be the basis for a new democratic identity. Sears and Hughes (2006) argue that simply promoting citizenship in the educational system without providing evidence that it can be transformative or meaningful reduces citizenship education to a form of indoctrination. This may be particularly dangerous in the context of post-conflict societies where students need to see and to believe in democratic citizenship. As noted earlier, teaching patriotism and national identity easily slides into nationalism, and there is some evidence that promoting ideas about global citizenship in the curriculum actually reinforces nationalism in students (Roman, 2003). Yet it is difficult to see how any of the

different forms of cosmopolitanism⁶ could counteract the experiences of violence (physical and psychological) that students and communities have witnessed. Both versions of *Class Enemy* point to the linkage between what is experienced and what is learned, as distinct from what is taught. Citizenship and citizenship education programmes seem unlikely to be meaningful if they do not provide a framework for reconciling experience and philosophy. That framework, then, is crucial for the sustainability of democracy in societies in the midst of transitions of all forms.

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⁶ See Mitchell (2007) for a review of different conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism and the political work they do.

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