



# **CENTER ON AMERICAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY**

**INDIANA UNIVERSITY**

Bloomington

## **NAVIGATING THE TURNING POINT: THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN**

*Report of a Policy Workshop*

The Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University is a non-partisan center dedicated to research, teaching, and service on homeland, national, and global security challenges facing the United States, other countries, and the global community.



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### **1. Introduction**

1. Pakistan's significance to the national security of the United States cannot be overstated. The United States needs a cooperative, capable, and committed Pakistan to stabilize Afghanistan's fledgling democracy, prevent the resurgence of the Taliban, continue the global fight against Al Qaeda, and create the conditions needed for achieving more order and peace in South Asia, especially in relations with India. The specter of worsening Pakistan-Afghan relations, a nuclear-armed Pakistan heading toward more violent internal strife, potential state collapse, and regional and international conflict also haunts U.S. interests in shoring up the increasingly fragile global nuclear non-proliferation order.

2. Given the importance of Pakistan to U.S. national security, the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University convened a policy workshop in January 2008 to seek the analyses and judgments of noted authorities on Pakistan concerning the future of U.S. policy towards this critical country. These experts were C. Christine Fair (Senior Political Analyst, RAND Corporation), Frederic Grare (Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Marvin Weinbaum (Fellow, Middle East Institute), and Sumit Ganguly (Professor of Political Science, Indiana University).

3. This Report attempts to capture the discussions of the policy workshop against the backdrop of wide-ranging discourse on Pakistan. The workshop particularly sought the views of the invited experts on what, moving forward, U.S. policy on Pakistan should most urgently address. The Report also seeks to include initial reflections from the policy workshop participants on the meaning of the elections in Pakistan in February 2008 for the future of U.S. policy towards that country. Without identifying particular ideas or opinions with specific experts, the Report presents a collective perspective developed at the workshop and after of the future of U.S. policy towards Pakistan.



## 2. Pakistan and the United States: Past and Present

4. The future of U.S. policy towards Pakistan remains influenced by the often difficult past of U.S.-Pakistan relations, and understanding the history of this relationship remains important in pondering not only present troubles but what lies ahead. At the heart of many contemporary difficulties between the United States and Pakistan is a legacy of mistrust produced by a failure to generate a sustainable convergence of strategic interests. Time and again, U.S. interest in Pakistan has fluctuated significantly based on America's immediate strategic concerns, be they containment of Soviet power or the global war on terrorism. The waxing and waning of U.S. interests concerning Pakistan has made Pakistanis, across the political spectrum, deeply suspicious of the United States, which has reinforced Pakistan's willingness to chart its own course in the region and beyond. This dynamic has produced a weak foundation for their relationship.

### *2.1 The Past: Pakistan and U.S. Geopolitical and Strategic Interests in South Asia*

5. Throughout the Cold War, the United States had a fitful relationship with Pakistan. American interests in Pakistan during the Cold War focused on Pakistan's willingness to provide military bases for conducting surveillance of Soviet bases in Central Asia. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan became the staging ground for the CIA's covert operations against Soviet forces.

6. India's warm relationship with the Soviet Union also provided incentives for the United States to work with Pakistan. American involvement with Pakistan cast a shadow on Indo-U.S. relations, especially when the United States supported Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute during the early Cold War years. India's doctrine of nonalignment did little to endear India to American policymakers, making Pakistan important for U.S. strategic interests in South Asia.

7. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the intensity of U.S. strategic interest in Pakistan waned, and U.S.-Pakistani relations became more strained and complicated by, among other things, sanctions Congress imposed because of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program. U.S. interests in re-engaging with Pakistan more seriously began to emerge shortly before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and quickly intensified when the United States needed Pakistan's help in pursuing Al Qaeda and toppling the Taliban regime, which Pakistan previously supported.

### *2.2 The Present: Pakistan as the Pandora's Box of South Asia*

8. The geopolitical machinations behind U.S.-Pakistan relations during the Cold War look simple compared to the maelstrom of problems now facing Pakistan and U.S. interests in South Asia and beyond. With the exception of the military, most of Pakistan's principal political and governance institutions are in worrying states of disarray and decay. The military itself faces serious questions about its corrosive role in Pakistani politics, and its incompetence in addressing the threat from Islamist militants has become too evident to deny. Pakistan faces violent threats internally and externally; it confronts

social fissures that stress governance capabilities; tensions abound with neighboring states; corruption and criminal forces threaten prospects for sustainable and more equitable economic development; and ecological problems stalk its future.

9. The brittle but volatile condition of Pakistan's polity directly and indirectly touches key U.S. interests regionally and globally. Pakistan's future remains linked with that of Afghanistan, and, unfortunately, Pakistan has emerged as an operating base for Al Qaeda, the neo-Taliban in Afghanistan, the so-called Pakistani Taliban, and Islamist organizations keen on wreaking havoc in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and in India. The growing strength of Islamist militants in Pakistan does not yet threaten Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, but Musharraf's handling of the A. Q. Khan nuclear scandal has created lingering worries about Pakistan's ability and willingness to contribute to international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the multiple dangers brewing in Pakistan affect U.S. efforts to improve its strategic relationship with India.

### **3. Musharraf, the Military, and the Militants: Pakistan under Pressure**

10. As the United States contemplates how the multiple problems besetting Pakistan affect American interests, the central policy challenges cluster around three objectives: helping Pakistan restore democracy, improve governance capabilities, and achieve external and internal security. These challenges are interdependent. Without the restoration of democratic politics, Pakistan will not succeed in strengthening national governance and achieving securing internal order, and *vice versa*.

11. These challenges are not, of course, new with respect to U.S. policy towards Pakistan, but, in the past, the United States has failed to take a comprehensive approach to its interests in Pakistan. Instead, the United States has too often emphasized short-term strategic or security gains at the expense of investing in the region through long-term, integrated strategies. U.S. military assistance to the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, combined with the simultaneous U.S. support for the brutal Pakistani regime of General Zia-al-Haq, fueled Islamist militancy in the region while weakening democratic institutions in Pakistan. These weaknesses contributed to problems that plagued the emergence of democratic politics in Pakistan in the 1990s, problems to which the United States showed indifference and which set the stage for Musharraf's *coup* in 1999.

12. After September 11, 2001, after more than a decade of neglecting Pakistan, the United States embraced Musharraf's military regime in order to prosecute the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in the region. The support the United States has given Musharraf and the Pakistani military further undermined Pakistan's democratic and governance capabilities. As explored below, this American backing for military rule in Pakistan has not produced improved security for Pakistan or the United States, leaving U.S. policymakers with neither short-term gains nor positive long-term prospects from their approach to Pakistan.

### *3.1 Musharraf and the Democracy Problem in Pakistan*

13. Musharraf's military regime has stultified prospects for democratic politics in Pakistan through militarization of Pakistani society. In a manner reminiscent of General Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf has allowed the military to penetrate state and non-state civilian institutions in Pakistan and disrupt their functioning. He has, for example, appointed former military officers to senior positions in universities in order to put the military in effective charge of these institutions. Simultaneously, he hobbled the two principal political parties (the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)), encouraged the rise of Islamist parties, exploited the deliberately maintained lawlessness in the tribal border areas, harassed the press and curtailed its freedoms, amended the Constitution to preserve his grip on power, and abused the judiciary.

14. In its urgent and single-minded quest to utilize Pakistan as a staging ground for operations against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States acted as if it perceived Musharraf was indispensable to achieving U.S. objectives. Musharraf exploited this perception to strengthen his grip on power and expand the military's role in Pakistani life. Through his own over-reaching (e.g., the removal of a defiant Supreme Court justice) and the military's failure to contain militants and terrorists in Pakistan, Musharraf began to lose control of events, and he became the cause and the symptom of Pakistan's damaged democratic potential.

### *3.2 The Military and the Governance Problem in Pakistan*

15. The damage to Pakistan's democratic prospects from Musharraf's reign connects to the erosion of the foundations in Pakistan for good governance. Functioning states require more than elections; they require far-reaching and sophisticated governance capabilities within governmental (e.g., legislature, police) and non-governmental (e.g., civil society groups, economic markets) institutions. The militarization of Pakistan's governance environment by Musharraf and earlier military regimes has significantly weakened the institutional capabilities needed to establish and maintain good governance.

16. The military's penetration of virtually every aspect of Pakistani politics and economics warps how governmental entities and non-governmental actors behave. Space for independent political initiative and accountable governance action disappeared in Pakistan under military rule. The military's omnipresence in Pakistani governance has co-opted and weakened political parties, neutered civil society activism, cowed much of the judiciary, rendered the legislature a rubber stamp for the military, frightened and corrupted the civil service, hollowed out the Pakistani police, and given the military control over lucrative segments of the economy.

17. Just as Musharraf became the indispensable ruler, the military has become the indispensable institutional actor because governance does not occur in Pakistan without its imprimatur. For all practical purposes, the military has made itself the only viable governance institution in Pakistan. U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan after September 11, 2001, has both reflected and exacerbated this problem because the United States has

worked exclusively with and through the Pakistani military, with, to date, little to show for all the American money and military aid provided to Pakistan.

18. Not surprisingly, the Pakistani military has tended to utilize its governance monopoly in ways it believes best serves its interests, and these ways have not aligned with U.S. objectives. The Pakistani military has not been willing on many occasions to cooperate fully with the United States in suppressing a range of Islamist militant groups and terrorist organizations. Before and after September 11, 2001, the Pakistani military, particularly the intelligence services, supported and protected these groups and organizations in order to exploit them to achieve the military's goals of achieving "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and wresting Indian-controlled Kashmir from India. Despite the growing dangers to other countries and Pakistan itself, the military continues to try to play the terrorism card in pursuit of its interests.

19. Unfortunately, the military's governance capabilities are themselves unraveling, threatening to leave Pakistan without any viable governance assets to confront violent threats from Islamist militant groups and terrorists. The military is proving increasingly unable to address effectively the Islamist organizations now wreaking havoc throughout Pakistan and especially in the frontier regions on the Afghan border. Largely built and maintained to engage in conventional land warfare against India, the Pakistani military has been unable to carry out serious, sustained, and effective counterinsurgency operations against Islamist militants in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Although the military has carried out some counterinsurgency operations with limited success (e.g., in the Swat valley), its efforts have suffered from deficient will, inadequate capabilities, and organizational limitations. The Pakistani military is not well prepared to execute flexible, small-unit tactics driven by unit-level leadership that characterize successful counterinsurgency operations. The lack of a counterinsurgency strategy and capabilities has produced an amalgam of ineptitude and brutality that eviscerates the military's legitimacy and its pre-eminent role in Pakistan.

20. As counterinsurgency doctrine stresses, fighting insurgents and militants requires robust civilian, political, and law enforcement action to accompany military operations. But, as indicated above, the ability of the Pakistani state to mobilize governance capabilities beyond the military is severely compromised by the military's preponderance of power and influence. The weakness of the police in Pakistan is a particular problem with trying to fight effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Governance in Pakistan finds itself in a very dangerous and precarious position, especially in light of the security challenges the nation increasingly faces.

### *3.3 The Militants and the Security Problem in Pakistan*

21. The growing power and ambitions of militant Islamist groups pose a serious threat to Pakistan's immediate and long-term security and stability. As evidenced by the on-going failure to end its use of terrorist groups and to devise appropriate civilian and military strategies to confront these groups, the military regime has yet to fashion a coherent approach to the challenge presented by Islamist militancy. Equally worrying are

the military regime's inability to understand the changing nature of the threat these groups represent and its continued attempts to manipulate the groups as pawns of Pakistan's strategic interests.

22. Until the summer of 2007, when the Pakistani military attacked Islamist militants who had seized control of the Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) in the heart of Islamabad, the various militant groups operating within Pakistan could be divided into two groups. One group still cooperated with the Pakistani military and were still willing to do the military's bidding. The other group was mostly hostile because of Musharraf's cooperation with the United States. Since the attack on the Red Mosque, the interests of the two groups have converged in mounting attacks inside Pakistan against the intelligence service and military, changing the security environment dramatically for the Pakistani government. Disturbingly, both groups appear to have sympathizers and collaborators within the Pakistani military. Without militant penetration of at least lower echelons of the military, the November 2007 attack on Sargodha, an important air force base, would not have succeeded. Once content to use terrorism as an instrument against other countries, Pakistan now faces its own war on terrorism.

23. To make matters worse, many militant groups within Pakistan have ties to Al Qaeda. Consequently, they do not threaten merely the security of Pakistan but the entire region, especially the fragile situation in Afghanistan, and other countries, such as the United Kingdom. Increasingly, evidence also suggests that Pakistani groups have developed ties to Islamist organizations engaging in violence within Bangladesh. Indeed, given the political turmoil in Bangladesh and the vast ungoverned areas within that country, Bangladesh may soon become more of a magnet and haven for militant Islamist organizations. Beyond South Asia, the Al Qaeda ties give these new coalitions of militants potential global reach, which is particularly worrying for the United Kingdom and the United States.

24. Unfortunately, U.S. policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism (e.g., the detention and treatment of Muslims at Baghram, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib) have enraged the citizenry in Pakistan and Afghanistan and provided Islamist militants in both countries with much fodder for their efforts to justify their violence. Militant exploitation of American actions has short-term and long-term costs for the United States. In the short term, the militants gain ground against the military regime in Pakistan and its American ally. In the long term, militant exploitation of American policies generates in the Pakistani population an unwillingness to work with the United States on the democracy, governance, and security agenda needed to ensure Pakistan's security and stability.

#### **4. The February 2008 Elections: Truth and Consequences**

25. Given the dangerous stakes for all concerned in Pakistan, the elections held on February 18, 2008 represented a critical inflection point for the future of Pakistan and U.S. policy. Despite gloomy prognostications, the elections delivered a decisive democratic hammer-blow to Musharraf's political legitimacy and hurt the credibility of

Islamist parties, particularly those the election removed from office. Perhaps against all odds, the election may have opened an opportunity for Pakistan and the United States to maneuver out of the dangerous dead end reached by 2007.

26. Of the 191 contested seats in Pakistan's 272-seat parliament, the PPP won 87 seats, the PML-N captured 66 seats, and Musharraf's party took only 38 seats. As of this writing, post-election developments pointed to the PPP and PML-N forming a coalition government, which would accelerate the decline in Musharraf's political position within and outside Pakistan. Any coalition government will face enormous challenges addressing the democracy, governance, and security problems analyzed in this Report, and the longer Musharraf lingers on the political scene, the harder it will be for the new democratically elected parliament to make progress.

27. The Pakistani people have given themselves a new birth of democratic optimism and have delivered to the United States a way to extricate itself from the mess backing Musharraf produced. Pakistanis should decide what now happens to Musharraf, not the United States, which now must shift its support to helping Pakistanis build new governance capabilities. The United States can help (1) work with General A. P. Kiyani (the new Army chief of staff) to refocus the military on addressing real threats to Pakistan's security; and (2) provide support to the coalition government's efforts to end Pakistan's use of terrorist groups, restore an independent judiciary, lift restrictions on freedom of the press, de-militarize the civil service and educational institutions, make the return of democracy sustainable, and concentrate the power of the Pakistani state and people on improving the prospects for a more prosperous and safer society.

## **5. Pakistan's Turning Point: Critical Policy Issues for the United States**

28. Sooner rather than later, the United States must acknowledge that its current policies do not advance U.S. interests with Pakistan and in the region. With Musharraf increasingly a symbol of all that is wrong with Pakistan, the Pakistani military losing control of the political and security realities on the ground, and the militants aggressively on the march, the United States must confront the need to reformulate its policy approach towards Pakistan. The February elections only underscore this conclusion.

### *5.1 Caveat America: Limits on U.S. Influence over Events in Pakistan*

29. Unfortunately, the reformulation of U.S. policy towards Pakistan must appreciate serious limits on U.S. influence on the trajectory of events in Pakistan. U.S. support for Musharraf and the military have seriously tarnished America's power and credibility. In addition, the current configuration of political forces and actors, even taking into account the results of the February 2008 elections, leave the United States with few good policy options for shaping events in Pakistan positively. Despite losing the February 2008 elections, both Musharraf and the military maintain diminished but not inconsequential power and influence in Pakistan. The lack of U.S. leverage over events in Pakistan is not, however, reason for the United States to disengage because the costs of such an abnegation of responsibility would be dangerously high.

### *5.2 Restoring Democratic Traction: From Electionism to a Rule of Law Strategy*

30. In contemplating the advance of democratic politics in Pakistan, the United States cannot expect that holding elections is sufficient to address the myriad problems that confront the Pakistani polity. For election results to be transformed into sustainable reforms that better the prospects for the people of Pakistan, significant improvements must be made in the panoply of governance institutions that undertake the day-to-day work of democracy within the framework of the rule of law. The United States must design a more expansive strategy that focuses, with Pakistani government and non-governmental partners, on the re-construction or rejuvenation of the judiciary, the police, political parties, civil society groups, educational institutions, and the media, which are needed to restore and ground the rule of law in Pakistan.

31. Accomplishing these goals requires the United States to shift away from its near total reliance on the Pakistani military. The militarization of Pakistani governance and society creates, however, the challenge of getting the military to cooperate in transforming the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The unraveling of Musharraf's power, the outcome of the February 2008 elections, and the growing militant threat should provide the Pakistani military under General Kiyani with incentives to realize that it too must change its strategies and tactics and continue to work with the United States. Going forward, all aspects of past approaches should be re-evaluated, including the nature of military assistance the United States provides Pakistan. Although the level of support should remain significant, the United States can re-balance the assistance portfolio to increase spending on non-military support programs. Targeting military assistance to help Pakistan improve its counterinsurgency capabilities, as required by the latest Defense Authorization Act, should continue.

### *5.3 Constructive Containment of Islamist Militancy*

32. Most experts on Pakistan believe that Musharraf's and the military's attempts to address Islamist militancy have failed and will, unless changed, continue to do so at the risk of threatening the security of the entire nation and region. Pakistan's strategy of using militant groups and terrorists to achieve strategic aims has backfired badly, and, as the threat from the militants has mounted, the military regime's responses have been reactive, ad hoc, counterproductive, and lacking any purpose beyond short-term steps made from a position of weakness. Consequently, Pakistan needs to overhaul this strategy and put in place another one that is comprehensive in scope, addresses the underlying sources of Islamist appeal, and is directed toward the dismantling of existing Islamist networks regardless of their specific political or ideological orientation.

33. The United States can work with civilian and military leaders in Pakistan to overhaul the Pakistani approach to Islamist militancy. The poor showing of Islamist parties in the February 2008 elections indicates that the population would support a more comprehensive political and military strategy aimed at containing and then rolling back the influence the militants have achieved in the past few years. The more comprehensive

strategy cannot tolerate Pakistan's past penchant for cracking down on some militant groups while utilizing others for policy purposes.

#### *5.4 Bettering Pakistan-India Relations*

34. The United States should also include in its re-formulated policy approach to Pakistan renewed efforts to improve relations between Pakistan and India. Adverse Indo-Pakistani relations have dogged American policy towards the region for decades and prevented the three countries from making common cause against threats they all face. The historical dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani-American relationships will not suddenly disappear, as evidenced by Pakistani concerns about recent improvements in relations between India and the United States. The United States cannot make tensions between the two South Asian neighbors suddenly disappear, but more concerted U.S. attention to bettering Indo-Pakistani relations could help settle those relations down.

35. This goal will require all three countries to address the continuing problems between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In the past, Kashmir has proved an expedient excuse for Pakistan's military to aggregate power and monopolize the manner in which the Pakistani state utilized U.S. assistance. The United States will not be able to lecture Pakistan into dropping its long-standing claims to Kashmir or its worries about Indian power. Moving Pakistan towards more democratic politics and a more comprehensive strategy against Islamist militancy will, however, highlight how Pakistan's quest to wrest the remainder of Kashmir from India, and its unproductive relationship with India, have contributed to the perils Pakistan now confronts.

36. Achieving this transformation in Pakistani politics requires the United States to re-orient its military and development assistance to produce the coordinated, integrated civilian and military activities needed to provide security, governance under the rule of law, and democratic politics in Pakistan. Specifically, the United States must carefully calibrate military assistance to ensure such assistance benefits the comprehensive strategy against Islamist militancy and does not get diverted and exacerbate the prospects for improved Indo-Pakistani relations by provoking India's long-standing fears about Pakistani intentions towards Kashmir.

#### *5.5 Improving Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations*

37. In addition to the problems posed by Islamist militants, the Pakistani and Afghan governments have other serious issues they need to address in order to stabilize their relations. One urgent issue concerns the need to resolve disagreements between the two countries over determining their border. The Afghan government's refusal to accept the Durand Line as the border has stymied attempts to put the border issue behind both countries. The United States could encourage and mediate high-level efforts between the two countries to help them settle their long-running border dispute.

## 6. Recommendations for U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan

38. As analyzed above, U.S. policy towards Pakistan must cease to be one according nearly unconditional support to a military dictatorship that exploits terrorism as a political weapon and must develop a strategic framework that works simultaneously and in a coordinated manner towards restoring democratic politics, rebuilding governance institutions, and providing security from the growing threat of Islamist militancy. Under each of these objectives, options exist for U.S. policy makers to consider. This Report does not assess the possible costs and benefits of each option, but it does present these ideas to inform the policy discourse on Pakistan that has started and needs to continue. The Report also presents these policy options in the spirit of trying to prevent the United States from finding itself in the near future in the worst of all possible worlds—unilateral U.S. military action in a failed-state Pakistan against violent Islamist extremists all too happy to open another front in the global war against the United States.

### 6.1 Improving Security Against Islamist Militants

- *End Support for Terrorism through Comprehensive Anti-Militancy Policies.* The United States should work with the civilian government and military authorities in Pakistan to end the Pakistani military's long-standing tactic of exploiting some militants and extremists for strategic purposes in Afghanistan and Kashmir. To date, the United States has been soft on the Pakistani military on this problem because of the "indispensable" nature of Musharraf's rule and the military's power. The United States has only learned that this tolerance for Pakistani use of terrorist violence has reaped a bitter harvest.
- *Strengthen Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Capabilities.* Recent military failures in confronting the threat from Islamist militants reveal that the Pakistani military is ill-equipped and ill-trained for serious counterinsurgency operations, particularly in the frontier areas bordering on Afghanistan. Expressions by newly elected parliamentarians of a desire to engage in talks with militants should not obscure the reality that Pakistan will have to engage in military operations against militant groups. Following the latest Defense Authorization Act, the United States can work with Pakistan to improve the Pakistani military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations more effectively. This strategy requires the participation of civilian government authorities and terminating Pakistan's use of terrorism as a weapon.
- *Re-Evaluate U.S. Military Assistance.* Shifting the focus to strengthening Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities will require the United States to re-think all its military assistance to Pakistan, particularly assistance involving weapons and capabilities ill-suited for countering the militant threat. The United States should not continue to arm Pakistan primarily to defend itself against perceived military threats from India.



- *Improve the Pakistani Police.* Facing threats posed by militants and terrorists requires more than military capabilities. Key to successful security operations against such threats is robust and accountable police forces. At present, Pakistan's police forces are in dreadful shape and require immediate attention as part of the strategy to improve security conditions in Pakistan.

## 6.2 Restoring Democratic Politics in Pakistan

- *Consolidate Gains from the February 2008 Elections.* Although the February 2008 elections have, like many other developments, left recent U.S. policy towards Pakistan in shambles, the United States needs to move rapidly to help the democratic gains the election has produced become sustainable. Given the institutional weaknesses in the PPP and the PML-N, these political parties could flounder in trying to establish a civilian government, inviting possible political chaos and calls for a return to military rule.

- *Reform of Political Parties.* As many commentators have observed, the main political parties in Pakistan have tended to operate on the basis of personalities and family loyalties rather than on institutionalized policy commitments and programs. As the democratically elected parliament begins operating, the United States should offer to help Pakistani political parties develop the institutional features and capabilities they need to operate effectively within democratic politics.

- *Extend Opportunities for Democratic Politics.* To this day, the frontier areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan remain largely outside formal Pakistani governance processes, and Pakistan is now paying a severe price for its failure to integrate this region into Pakistani political and economic life. The United States should work with the civilian government and military leadership to end this isolation of the frontier areas and allow democratic political activities to take root in them. This extension of democratic politics should form part of the overall political and military strategies against the militants in those areas.

## 6.3 Re-Building Governance Institutions

39. In addition to improving the capabilities of the military to engage in counterinsurgency operations, the police to contribute to security under the rule of law, and political parties competing for the consent of the governed, the United States should help Pakistan improve other institutions critical to sustaining the governance needed to support simultaneously democracy and security. These governance institutions include:

- *Pakistan's Judiciary.* Although crippled by years of political and military intervention, Pakistan's lawyers and judges mounted the protest that proved the tipping point for Musharraf's rule. The United States should work with the civilian government to help restore the independence of the judiciary and enhance



its capabilities. An independent judiciary could become the rock for rule of law governance and democracy in Pakistan.

- *Civil Society Groups.* Civil society groups, such as NGOs, are keys to good governance and democratic politics. Pakistan has lacked effective civil society intermediaries operating between the military government and the population. In the wake of the February 2008 elections, the United States should work with Pakistani civilian leaders and non-governmental associations to create and occupy the governance space for civil society groups needed in Pakistani political life.

- *Pakistani Business Community.* Good governance, democracy, and security in Pakistan require a robust economy and business sector not weighed down by the corruption and uncertainty created during the years of military rule. The United States should review its trade policies towards Pakistan and work with Pakistani civilian and business leaders to chart a new course for economic development, trade, and investment in Pakistan.

## 7. Conclusion

40. The United States faces difficult choices in re-formulating its policies towards Pakistan. Re-orienting U.S. policy has implications not discussed in this Report but are worth mentioning, and these implications include the need to prepare more people in the U.S. government and NGO sectors to operate with and in Pakistan and to consider the formation of coalitions of states with strategic interests in the stability of Pakistan (e.g., China, the United Kingdom) to work collectively on helping Pakistan emerge from its current perils. Assisting Pakistan regain its security, the promise of democratic politics, and the foundation of good governance is a sobering but necessary task.

41. The United States has never engaged Pakistan in the comprehensive manner presented in this Report, so the path forward is the one less traveled by for both countries. Dire predictions about violence and massive vote-rigging destroying the legitimacy of the February 2008 elections have largely been proven wrong, and this development provides all involved in U.S.-Pakistan relations with a window of opportunity to set these relations on a new course. Seizing this opportunity now becomes an urgent responsibility and imperative for the United States and Pakistan.

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## **About the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University**

Indiana University established the Center on American and Global Security (CAGS) in March 2007 to harness the University's resources and capabilities to strengthen research, teaching, and service on the most pressing security issues facing the United States and the global community.

In addition to the Policy Workshop on "Navigating the Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan," CAGS' activities to date have included research projects on India's experiences with counterinsurgency campaigns and on national security letters, sponsoring the teaching of a seminar on "Counterinsurgency and Rule of Law Operations" at the Indiana University School of Law, a speaker series on "Understanding Suicide Terrorism," and service projects related to developing capacities for U.S. military and civilian agencies to conduct complex operations.

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